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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
) 
SOUTHERN TITLE GUARANTY CO., 
INC., a Texas corporation, ) 
Plaintiff-Appellant ) 
v. ) 
GLENN J. BETHERS and TELLA ) 
MAE BETHERS, husband and wife, 
Defendants-Respondents : 
) 
The appellant responds to Point I of the respondents' 
brief, which states that "the evidence does not clearly preponderate 
against the trial court's finding and conclusion that defendants 
were not unjustly enriched," as follows: 
Throughout the respondents' brief they have raised for the 
first time on appeal a number of issues which, needless to say, 
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. The first of these 
is the position that appellant cannot prevail on unjust enrichment 
because the Bethers did not have knowledge of what their agent 
was doing as far as individual lot releases, receipt of funds, etc. 
They just simply sat back and collected the money as it rolled in. 
There are two problems with this argument. The first is that the 
lack of knowledge by Bethers was never raised as a defense, does 
not form a part of the findings by the court and does not constitute 
in any way a basis for the court's judgment. This point is raised 
for the first time here, and it is raised repeatedly. We submit 
that this point of argument should be discarded and ignored by this 
court. 
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The second problem with this position is that the Bethers 
are charged with the acts and knowledge of their agent. This point 
is so basic that it should almost go without saying. "As a general 
rule, where the relation of agency legally exists, the principal 
will be liable to third persons for all acts committed by the 
agent in his behalf in the course and within the actual or apparent 
scope of his authority." 3 C.J.S. Agency, Sec. 390. Hornbook law, 
to say the least. Bethers cannot claim the benefit of the agent's 
actions, yet when something goes awry claim lack of knowledge of 
every act of his agent as a defense. Enough on this basic point. 
The statement that "the determination of when and how the 
proceeds from a Certificate of Deposit were to be paid to defendants 
was made by Sunwest. . . " is completely in error. The arrangement 
between the parties on payoffs was controlled by the agreements 
between the parties. Not the arbitrary decisions of Sunwest. 
Another point raised for the first time on appeal is the 
allegation that "the only evidence presented to the Court as to 
why Lot 1 was not released is that Valley Title determined, after 
a meeting with one of the defendants and a representative from 
Sunwest, to release Lot 5 rather than Lot 1. (Ex. 8.)" [Respondents' 
brief p. 11.] This factual allegation is not found in the findings, 
was not raised as an affirmative defense anywhere in the 
pleadings filed by the defendants, and the exhibit was not offered 
for the purpose of raising this point. (Tr. 28) The fact of the 
matter is that Exhibit 8 was introduced solely to show that the 
title company had written a reply letter wherein appellant's counsel 
was informed by the title company that there was still a balance 
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owing. (Lines 3,4 and 5 of Tr. 28) Thus, this point should be 
ignored by this court, which point, I might add, is raised throughout 
the defendants' brief. Evidence to refute such a position was 
available and this was known by defendants' counsel, which counsel 
was a different attorney than the attorney preparing the brief of 
the respondents. 
Respondents argue that the testimony of Mr. Hall from the 
title company was " . . . anything but convincing." (Respondents' 
brief, p. 11) We urge the court to examine closely the testimony 
of Mr. Hall. It is quite clear that he knew very well what was 
going on, the procedures that were used, and the import of the 
matters and evidence brought up and produced at the time of trial. 
Quite to the contrary, Mr. Hall's testimony is quite cogent. 
The defendants also argue that the money received " . . . 
was not earmarked nor specified as being related to any particular 
lot." (P. 12, Respondents' brief) This statement is completely 
contrary to the facts set forth in appellant's brief, and is 
unsupported in respondents' brief by any reference to any supporting 
evidence. At the same point in respondents' brief it is also argued 
that the money received was for the release of Lot 5. No such 
evidence exists. It should be borne in mind that respondents did 
not present any evidence of their own, and much of their brief is 
an attempt to put on their case to try and refute the facts that 
were before the court at the time it made its ruling. This they 
should not be permitted to do. 
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On page 12 of the respondents1 brief it is argued that 
"there was no net benefit conferred on defendants. * * * Finally, 
it was not inequitable for defendants to retain the benefit, where 
defendants received no more than that which Sunwest had contracted 
to pay and the remaining balance due was equal to the release prices 
for the remaining two lots." We find subtly argued here an argument 
made repeatedly by the defendants throughout these proceedings, 
that being that the plaintiff is somehow obligated to show a net 
increase to the defendants and to show where the error in accounting 
lies. This is grossly in error. As we have argued in our initial 
brief, all the plaintiff should have to show is that Lot 1 was paid 
for by the prececessors in interest of the plaintiff's insured. 
If we can show that Lot 1 was paid for, which we have done, then 
that is the end of the issue. Plaintiff is not obligated to pursue 
the matter further. Plaintiff is not obligated to see that the 
defendants get something extra from the transaction, or point out 
the source of the problem that has created the confusion in this 
case. Again, as stated, if the plaintiff can show that Lot 1 was 
paid for, that the defendants received those funds, then those funds 
are to be credited to that lot only, with the further resulting 
entitlement on the part of the buyers, and their successors in 
interest, to a clear fee title to that lot. It is also necessary 
to point out here that the allegation that the remaining balance 
due was equal to the release prices for the remaining two lots 
is totally without evidentiary support. No accounting or other 
evidence was produced by the defendants to support this position, 
or any other position, for that matter. 
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On page 13 of their brief, respondents state as follows: 
"It may be that plaintiff and the parties who purchased 
Lot 1, taken together, may have paid twice for Lot 1. It 
may follow that someone was unjustly enriched through receipt 
of those payments. That someone may have been Sunwest which, 
in contrast to defendants, received a payment labeled as 
being for Lot 1 and had knowledge concerning the chain of 
events which plaintiff now claims shows that defendants 
received a payoff for Lot 1. The evidence presented at trial 
does not address these questions." 
I don't know what trial counsel is referring to, but it is 
certainly clear that at the trial of this matter these were the 
very issues that were raised, and for Which evidence was produced. 
This statement, too, would seem to be an implied admission that 
Lot 1 was in fact paid for. It is certainly clear that Sunwest 
didn't retain the money because the evidence showed that the 
CD purchased for Lot 1 was received by the title company, was 
designated on the CD and on their records as having been received 
for Lot 1, was later redeemed and the funds from that redemption 
clearly and unequivocably traced to the Bethers, who cashed the 
check and retained the funds. These facts are clear and are totally 
ignored by the defendants. 
As to the respondents' point II, the following reply is made: 
The respondents seem to argue that the claim of the plaintiff 
is baseless because the money of the original purchasers was paid 
to Sunwest and the title company. So what? The title company 
was defendants' agent, Sunwest redeemed the CD in question and 
paid those funds to Bethers. The purchasers do not have to pay 
the money directly to defendants for plaintiff to have a cause of 
action. They go on to argue that " . . . the money which was 
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ultimately received by defendants was not for the release of Lot 
1 as far as the defendants were concerned." (Page 14, Respondents1 
brief) It doesn't matter what the concern of the defendants was 
as long as the money paid was to be applied for the purchase of 
a particular lot. This is the nature of the transaction and the 
funds are to be credited towards a lot designated by Sunwest. The 
funds are not to be credited however the defendants may wish. In 
addition, it is clear from Mr. Bethers testimony that he had no 
idea what was going on with the money and to which lots monies were 
to be applied. The title company handled all of that. The Bethers 
didn't even maintain any records which showed for which lots 
payments were being made. How then can the defendants have any 
opinion or concern on the matter? They know nothing. I might also 
add at this point that this issue of defendants would seem to be 
one concerning a new issue not presented in the case, not used as 
a basis for the judgment, and raised for the first time here—again. 
Defendants go on with the redundant argument on page 15 
that "a second infirmity of plaintiff's argument is in its assumptior 
that plaintiff acquired a right of action against defendants for a 
release of Lot 1 by reason of being subrogated to the rights of the 
purchasers of Lot 1." This is a standing issue which was raised 
by summary judgment in the court below and which issue was decided 
in favor of the plaintiff. A chain of title was clearly established 
and the right of the plaintiff to maintain the action was ruled upon 
by the court in favor of plaintiff. This argument is an attempt to 
raise that issue anew. It should also be noted that this point did 
-7-
not form a basis of the lower court's judgment in favor of the 
defendants which is the basis of this appeal. The defendants 
further argue that plaintiff has no right to maintain this action 
because no payment was made directly to defendants by certain 
undesignated parties, and Norman Anderson and his successors in 
interest had no contract with the defendants. First, as stated 
above, they do not have to make the payment directly to the 
defendants to have a claim against defendants for their wrongful 
conduct. That would be a pointless and empty act. The only 
consideration is whether or not the defendants received the monies 
due for Lot 1. The plaintiff isn't entitled to bring this action 
only if Norman Anderson went to Glenn Bethers and paid him 
personally for Lot 1. All of these obtuse and tangential arguments 
do nothing but attempt to obfuscate the real issues. The fact is 
that the Bethers did receive the funds in question. Those funds 
were paid to them by Sunwest. That is all that matters. I might 
also add still again that this point does not form a basis of the 
lower court's decision, and was never raised as a defense during 
the course of the proceedings. 
In addition, the Andersons and their successors in interest, 
including this plaintiff, do have a contract with the defendants* 
They have an unbroken chain of warranty deeds with their attendant 
warranties. 
On page 15 of the defendants brief they next argue that 
plaintiff cannot maintain this action because of finding number 20 
of the Findings of Fact (R. 192) , which states that "Sunwest II 
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would not have been entitled to a reconveyance of Lot 1 on October 
25, 19 84, without paying to the defendants at least the sum of 
$9,563.38." The court here is not addressing itself to the issue 
of legal standing. The court had already ruled plaintiff was 
entitled to maintain its action (which ruling has not been appealed). 
The court is simply finding that it doesn't believe the defendants 
were paid twice of Lot 1. 
Defendants next argue (page 15, Respondent's brief) the 
incredible notion that "plaintiff's [sic] admitted at trial that 
defendants had not received any more than what they were entitled 
to receive under their contract with Sunwest, and that defendants 
had not been unjustly enriched if the entire transaction between 
Sunwest and defendants was viewed as a whole." This peculiar and 
grossly distorted interpretation of the case would cause one to 
believe that the plaintiff at the trial admitted it didn't have a 
case, but thought it would proceed in any event. It is important 
that we adhere to a realistic situation and not dabble in fantasy. 
The plaintiff has never taken such a position, and has never made 
any such admission. 
The defendants go on to argue that plaintiff paid the money 
with full knowledge of all of the facts and therefore cannot 
obtain a refund of the money. Nothing could be further from the 
truth. It is very clear that when the money was paid the plaintiff: 
counsel and the plaintiff did not have a full knowledge of all 
of the facts. Indeed, the plaintiff relied upon facts supplied to 
it by the defendants' agent to the effect that the monies owing 
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for Lot 1 had never been received. Based upon these representations, 
and other assurances from defendants that the monies were still due, 
the funds in question were paid in order to protect the interest 
of plaintiff's insured in the subject property. Contrary to what 
the defendants argue, plaintiff does not waive its rights by not 
first filing a lawsuit to determine if the money is due. This 
court has held that "a waiver is the intentional relinquishment of 
a known right. To constitute a waiver, there must be an existing 
right, benefit or advantage, a knowledge of its existence, and an 
intention to relinquish it." American Savings & Loan Assn. v. 
Blomquist, 21 Utah 2d 289, 292 445 P2d 1, 3 (1968). None of these 
elements are satisfied here, and defendants1 allegation is an 
empty claim, unsupported by any evidence or any reference to the 
record on appeal. If plaintiff felt it had a reasonable basis 
to believe that the payment for Lot 1 was still due, then it was 
entitled to act upon that belief, and not be required to instigate 
possibly needless litigation to protect its position in case it 
was wrong, or to go fishing for a possible alternative fact situation. 
This court has before admonished against the use of litigation for 
fishing purposes. (See Shayne v. Stanely & Sons, Inc., 605 P2d 775, 
Utah 1980.) Further, it is quite obvious that the plaintiff did 
not have full knowledge of all of the facts. (Even if it did, their 
allegation is again unsupported by any reference to the record.) 
It was not until later that it appeared that defendants had been 
paid twice. How defendants can conclude that plaintiff had all 
of the facts at the time the payment was made is beyond the 
understanding of the plaintiff. Furthermore, it is interesting to 
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note that any reasonable person in plaintiff's position, had that 
person known all of the facts, had they known at the time the 
payment was made what is now known, would never have made the 
payment, and would have resisted in the courts any efforts on the 
part of the defendants to foreclose their deed of trust. It is 
also important to keep in mind that the information upon which the 
plaintiff relied was supplied by the defendants through their agent. 
They cannot be allowed to provide false information, regardless of 
the motive, or their best intentions, and then claim that plaintiff 
cannot proceed against them because it should have known better. 
It should also be noted in their point II that defendants 
continue time and time again to claim ignorance of any of the goings 
on as a defense to any and all claims, ignoring all the while 
that it was defendants1 agent that was involved in the thick of 
things, and for whose actions and knowledge the defendants are 
chargeable. 
As to defendant's point III, the following reply is made: 
The whole issue of mistake is raised throughout the 
proceedings below, beginning with the plaintiff's complaint filed 
at the outset of these proceedings. Mistake is central to the whole 
case. As this court stated in Mabey v. Kay Peterson Construction 
Co., Utah, 682 P2d 287, 289 (1984), 
11
 [W] hen issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by 
express or implied consent they shall be treated in all 
respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. 
Rule 15(b) [U.R.C.P.]; Poulsen v. Poulsen, Utah, 672 P2d 
97 (1983); General Insurance Co. of America v. Carnicero 
Dynasty Corp., Utah, 545 P2d 502 (1976); Holdaway v. Hall, 
29 Utah 2d 77, 505 P2d 295 (1973)." 
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Actually, under the facts of this case it would be virtually 
impossible to deal with the case without discussing in detail the 
issue of mistake. 
As to point IV, it should not even be dignified by a reply, 
except to say that had counsel paid attention to the nature of the 
case he would see that this is a case revolving around the import 
and effect of the facts, and the outcome is not dependent in any 
significant degree upon legal issues to be supported by authorities. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This is a case that centers on whether or not sufficient 
factual proof has been produced to show ahd prove that the 
defendants in this action have been paid twice for Lot 1. We 
believe that the detailed presentation of the facts in our original 
brief on appeal show that an unbroken chain in the delivery of 
funds from the original purchaser—Norman Anderson—to the original 
seller—the Bethers—existed. Thus, when Norman Anderson paid 
Sunwest at the closing for Lot 1, funds to release that lot from 
the all encompassing deed of trust were paid to the Bethers, and 
that when the CD was issued and delivered to the title company, 
at which time the lot was to have been released per the agreement 
with defendants but was not, Lot 1 was the lot designated by 
Sunwest as the lot for which the CD was being deposited. The case 
is that simple, When there is ample proof that Norman Anderson 
paid for the lot, that a CD was purchased and deposited with the 
title company, designating the CD to be for Lot 1, and when that 
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very same CD was later redeemed and the funds from that CD 
redemption then paid to the defendants, it is hard to imagine how 
they can claim they haven't been paid for the lot. Thus, when 
the plaintiff, believing that the lot had not been paid for paid 
the subject amount to the defendants, the lot was paid for a second 
time. Any other issues or points are beside the point, and that 
includes all of this talk about substitute collateral. Defendants 
seem to feel that if plaintiff wants its money back it has to 
substitute back in the same lot, other collateral to protect the 
defendants. Nonsense—literally. If defendants have been paid 
twice for the lot they are not entitled to the return of the lot 
before they are obligated to return the duplicated purchase price. 
At the trial these facts were argued to the court. The 
following dialogue ensued: 
THE COURT: Now, assuming that that is all true, and that 
that's what that chain would establish, don't you still have to 
prove that Mr. Bethers received something beyond what the contract 
price required to be paid him for his property? You're just 
claiming unjust enrichment? 
Mr. WALL: We're claiming unjust enrichment in that—and 
it's in the Pretrial Order that in addition to having received 
that amount for Lot 1, Southern Title now has also, because of the 
mis-up, wherever it has occurred, has also paid him for Lot 1. 
THE COURT: Don't you have to show that the total payments 
he has received have exceeded the amount that he was entitled to 
under the contract? Not just isolate it on Lot No. 1 and the 
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way things came down on Lot 1? 
MR. WALL: I don't believe so, your Honor." (Tr. 80) 
Herein lies what we believe to be a key error in both the 
reasoning of the court and that of the defendants. Certainly if 
we could show where the money had been wrongly credited, and/or 
show that defendants had been paid more than they were entitled 
on an overall basis, then plaintiff's case would be substantially 
bolstered. However, plaintiff has been unable to show where the 
overall error lies, but plaintiff has been able to show that when 
Lot 1 was paid for the credit didn't go to Lot 1. If the agreement 
between the parties had been such that monies paid didn't go to 
particular lots, then defendants would have a point, but when the 
terms of the agreement are such that when a particular lot is 
paid for it is to be released and a reconveyance issued, then that 
lot should be released and reconveyed, without regard or concern 
for other problems between the parties. In this case we submit 
that the court was wrong. That we can isolate Lot 1 only and show 
that it was paid for. If we can do that, and key to this case is 
our position that we have shown that, then that lot should have 
been reconveyed years ago when Norman Anderson bought the lot, and 
any payments paid for that lot afterwards, such as that by the 
plaintiff, become superfulous, and thus funds to which the 
defendants are not entitled. 
Also, if plaintiff were a party to the original contract, 
as is Sunwest, and in the place of Sunwest, then how the payment 
of plaintiff was to be credited, and whether or not defendants are 
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entitled to retain those funds would be issues to be resolved 
upon different grounds and from a different perspective. However, 
that is not the case here, and as a result we respectfully submit 
that the decision of the district court was in error and the 
plaintiff is entitled to a return of its monies. 
DATED this y/Q^day of December, 1986. 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
Suite 800 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
521-8220 
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